Unrequited Gifts: The Tax Fallout by Hutton, William T.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
1990
Unrequited Gifts: The Tax Fallout
William T. Hutton
UC Hastings College of the Law, huttonw@uchastings.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Taxation-Federal Estate and Gift Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation





UC Hastings College of the Law Library 
 
Author: William T. Hutton  
Source: Back Forty 
Citation: 1 BACK FORTY 6 (Oct. 1990). 
Title: Unrequited Gifts: The Tax Fallout 
   
Originally published in BACK FORTY. This article is reprinted with permission from BACK FORTY and The 
Hyperion Society.
6 
The Hark Fort~ 
the owner of more than 20% of a corporation's voting stock, a 
partnership's profits interest, or the beneficial interest of a trust is 
tainted by the substantial contributions of that entity. 
Unrequited Gifts: The Tax Fallout 
Tax cases, dealing as they do with well-aged trans-
actions and strategies, may not often provide a source of 
creative inspiration, but they certainly offer both object 
lessons and useful maxims. Take the 885 Investment 
Company, subject of a recent Tax Court exegesis on 
defeasible gifts, jurisdictional collisions, and the tax 
benefit rule. (If any of those subjects seems less than 
self-defining, hang in there, and all will be explained 
anon.) 
The 885 Investment Company was a California 
limited partnership, which in 1987 acquired some 178 
acres in Sacramento. A few months prior to 885's ac-
quisition, the Sacramento city council had adopted a 
land use plan providing for the maintenance of a scenic 
corridor along Interstate Highway 5. A small portion of 
885's property lay within the proposed scenic corridor, 
and the partnership was soon approached about its will-
ingness to donate that portion to the city. 
Lesson One: A partnership is not a taxable entity; 
its charitable contributions flow through to the 
partners, and each takes as his own deduction a 
share of the total contribution, based upon his en-
titlements under the partnership agreement. 
The city appeared to be serious about establishing 
the scenic corridor, and towards that end it purchased, in 
June 1979, some 2.33 acres within the corridor for 
$73,820. All other parcels thereafter acquired within the 
corridor were contributed, however, among them a slice 
measuring .664 acres contributed by the 885 partnership 
on December 21, 1979. That gift was conditioned, how-
ever, at the city's insistence, on ultimate use of the land 
as part of the scenic corridor; in the event that such use 
was not accomplished, the city had the right to "deed said 
real property back to the owner .... " In respect of that gift, 
885 claimed a $115,695 charitable contribution. 
Maxim One: Beware of donees looking gift par-
cels in the mouth. This is hardly a typical reaction, 
and, at the least, the partnership should have asked, 
"What if ... ?" and played through the possible out-
comes. 
In February 1981,885 agreed to donate an addi-
tional5.523 acres. That donation was subject to the same 
possibility of reconveyance, should the scenic corridor 
plans come to naught. 
Not long thereafter, the city began to have second 
thoughts about the whole scenic corridor idea. The 
prospect of state funding had evaporated, and liability 
concerns had arisen. Hence it was determined in 1982 to 
reconvey to 885 the 1979 and 1981 gift parcels. 
Lesson Two: Governments often change their 
minds. (This is a lesson, falling somewhat short of 
the maxim "Governments are not to be trusted.") 
But the reconveyance was complicated by further 
negotiations. 885 agreed to develop and maintain the 
returned parcels as a scenic corridor and to contribute to 
a fund to ensure their maintenance, and, in return, the 
city approved increased density for the partnership's 
developable property adjacent to the corridor. Under 
those conditions, the reconveyance was effected in 1983. 
As returned, the gift parcels were subject to use restric-
tions that left no alternative but maintenance as a "scenic 
landscaped corridor." 
Lesson Three: The properties returned to 885 were 
far different from the parcels donated in 1979 and 
1981. The newly imposed use restrictions drastical-
ly reduced their values (a circumstance 
astonishingly ignored in the Tax Court's analysis), 
and in gaining density approvals as a condition of 
its maintenance obligation, 885 obviously ex-
tracted consideration that would have defeated the 
original deductions entirely, had it been bargained 
for in connection with the 1979 and 1981 gifts. 
The procedural setting for this adjudication was 
peculiar. Owing to the IRS' failure to assert in a timely 
manner a deficiency on account of the (allegedl y flawed) 
1979 deduction, the tax benefits attributable to that gift 
were not in issue, but the effect to the taxpayer of the 
return of the 1979 gift parcel was very much in focus. 
As to the 1981 gift, 885' s asserted deduction of $962,328 
was entirely denied by the Service on the ground that, 
on the date of the gift, the "possibility of occurrence" of 
a reversion of the property to the partnership was "not 
so remote as to be negligible," under applicable (and 
venerable) regulations. The court agreed, as it had little 
choice but to do. The "so remote as to be negligible" 
standard has been applied in dozens of cases, and an 
assistant Sacramento city manager testified for the 
government that, at the time of the 1981 donation, 
prospects for public funding of the scenic corridor were 
gloomy. 
Maxim Two: Tax benefits at which large donations 
are aimed must be impervious to attack, except on 
valuation grounds. The 1981 donation was the 
main-event issue in this case, involving a challenge 
to federal income tax benefits (i.e., dollars saved on 
account of the 1981 donation) aggregating ap-
proximately $480,000 to the 885 partners. Had the 
partnership's advisors refused to accede to the 
city's requested reverter provision, the deduction 
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would have been beyond challenge, except, per-
haps, on valuation grounds. 
The effects of the return of the 1979 property, 
although by no means as dramatic financially, are a tax 
student's nightmare-the stuff of which final exams are 
made. On account of the reverter clause, the 1979 gift 
was as defective as the later and larger donation, but the 
IRS had failed to mount an attack before the statute of 
limitations for that year had run. Nonetheless, the game 
was far from over; the government sought to invoke the 
"tax benefit rule" to mitigate its earlier neglect. 
In this context, the tax benefit rule essentially 
requires that where a taxpayer has had the benefit of a 
previous deduction (here, the 1979 contribution), which, 
in the fullness of time, turns out to be inconsistent with 
a later event (the return of the 1979 parcel), income is 
required to be reported in the later year. Under the Tax 
Court's own prior interpretations of the rule, however, it 
only applies where the prior deduction was properly 
asserted. Since 885's earlier gift was flawed by the 
possibility of reverter, it would seem that the 
government's only remedy would have been to attack 
the deduction itself prior to the running of the statute of 
limitations. 
Lesson Four: The judicial resolution of a tax con-
troversy is a long and arduous road, often leading 
to surprising and/or unsatisfying conclusions. 
But alas, despite the Tax Court's own prior ex-
press views on the proper reach of the tax benefit rule, it 
has also determined to follow cases decided by the 
judicial circuit to which an appeal will run. An appeal in 
the 885 case would run to the Ninth Circuit, and that 
court has refused to limit the tax benefit rule to cases not 
involving prior erroneous deduction. Thus the Tax Court 
was constrained to hold that the return of the 1979 gift 
property produced taxable income in 1983. (You might 
expect something like this in "Godot Meets the Tax 
Collector," but this is real life.) 
Maxim Three: Courts frequently overlook things. 
Having concluded that the 1983 recovery of the 
parcel gifted in 1979 is subject to inclusion in income, 
the final task facing the court was to determine how 
much that inclusion should be. Ignoring entirely the fact 
that the property recovered in 1983, unlike the 1979 gift, 
was burdened with elaborate development and use 
restrictions, and further, that the 1983 negotiations might 
well have been considered a "new deal" vitiating entirely 
the "reverter" construction on which tax benefit is 
premised, the court determined the value of the recon-
veyed two-thirds acre by reference to the unencumbered 
2.33 acres purchased by the city from an unrelated 
landowner for $73,820 in 1979! The prorated value 
arrived at for 885's .664-acre parcel-$21,04O-is thus 
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the result of an exquisitely irrelevant computation. (The 
tax arbitrage was not bad, even so, since the $115,695 
deduction in 1979 produced about $81,000 in tax 
benefits [at 70%] and the $21,040 deemed recovery 
produced a 1983 liability of aoout $10,500 [at 50%].) 
What can one say about all of this? Maybe that if 
you have a prospective partnership transaction, absorb 
the lessons, observe the maxims, and don't let anyone 
talk aoout the 885 case. And should it come up, assure 
them that you consider it a perfect example of the kind 
of planning you intend not to abet. 885 Investment Co., 
95 T.C._, No. 12 (August 16, 1990).-William T. Hut-
ton 
Federal Claims Court Awards 
Millions in Damages to 
Landowners for Regulatory 
Taking 
In two recent decisions with potentially far-reach-
ing effects on government programs to preserve wet-
lands, a Federal claims court in Florida has awarded 
$1,029,000 and $2,658,000 in damages to two respective 
landowners for an alleged "regulatory taking" of their 
property. Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 
1990 U.S. Cl. Ct. LEXIS 281 (filed July 23, 1990); 
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 1990 U.S. Cl. 
Ct. LEXIS 280 (filed July 23, 1990). In ooth cases, the 
court held that the federal government's denial of per-
mits to fill wetlands on the landowner's properties, pur-
suant to section 404 of the Federal Clean Water Act (see 
The Back Forty, September 1990), resulted in a taking 
that required the government to pay just compensation 
under the Fifth Amendment. These decisions are sig-
nificant because they are among the first to award 
damages to a landowner as a result of permit denial under 
the Section 404 permitting program. In fact, in United 
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 128 
(1985), the United States Supreme Court specifically 
declined to award damages for a taking claim under 
section 404 of the Clean Water Act. 
The just compensation clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment is intended to bar the government from forcing a 
few people to bear public burdens that "in all fairness 
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
Thus, when a particular governmental regulation causes 
values incident to property to be diminished by a "certain 
magnitude," the United States Supreme Court has held 
that the government has in effect "taken" the property 
owner's land by inverse condemnation, requiring just 
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